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I have read with great sympathy the innovative proposal of Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis. 
It speaks out bluntly an alluring idea: How easy it may be to heal the deficiencies of state 
administration, if only we could appoint a few hundred well-educated, capable civil servants of high 
moral integrity at key positions of the Government. This seems to be a cure to be prescribed to states 
facing a crisis of the rule of law. There are, however, a couple of questions that need to be addressed 
in order for this proposal to be viable. I will take two of these, one concerns the democratic 
environment, the other one guarantees of the rule of law. 
(1) The general background of my first remark is the populist surge in Europe and in the USA. The rise 
of Trumpism has sent many to search for the mistakes the liberal elites have made in fostering our 
liberal-democratic political and economic order. If successful, this soul-searching may lead to more 
inclusive politics that address the needs of those in the Western societies on the losing side of 
globalisation. One may hope that “bad” populism based on anger and hatred can be defeated by such 
“good” populism. In any case, the trend is definitely towards more democracy. 
Against this background, replacing several hundred civil servants in key positions of the Greek 
administration by people from the Greek diaspora in accordance with the established competitive 
procedures of the European Commission and granting them European salaries from European 
resources could be seen extremely critical by those constituents who search for the source of evil 
outside of Greece. Not only could this fuel an unprecedented rise of populist parties in Greece but it 
could also serve as a perfect demonstration of those populist politicians in other European countries 
who try to demonise Brussels as a sort of colonising power. Hence, the implementation of the proposal 
would require a very high level of democratic legitimacy. The paper reflects on this by referring to the 
necessity of an approval of the appointments by the Greek authorities. I would suggest that we would 
need more than that. The proposed move is so bold that anything short of legitimisation by the Greek 
people would question its viability. I do not mean a referendum here. Rather, the reform should ideally 
be one of the central programs of a Greek Government or at least of important political parties.  
Further, civil servants do not operate in a vacuum: They both execute and develop policies for which 
elected officials are responsible. The cooperation between politicians and civil servants presupposes a 
certain level of mutual trust and the capability of the elected officials to enthuse their constituents for 
the respective policy. Thus, elected officials must not conceive the project as imposed on them. 
Whether or not this is possible largely depends on the fatigue of the Greek people and their 
perceptions of their own state administration and the European Union, respectively. The promise of 
an effective administration partly funded by EU sources might be alluring enough if the constituents 
blame their own political system for the misery of the country. If so, politicians may be ready to own 
the project and campaign on this promise. If not, they will probably sabotage or rebel against it. At 
present, there are at least some promising voices from Greece. 
(2) My second remark roots in my specific Hungarian experience. The idea of elite change is not novel 
to me, yet the context is radically different. The policy of the Hungarian Government after 2010 was 
largely directed at carrying out such a change. The fact that parts of public administration or even of 
the judiciary deserved a thorough reform was beyond question. Yet, the execution of this policy has 
aptly demonstrated the resulting challenges the rule of law had to face. I analysed these in depth with 
my colleagues elsewhere.1 I shall restrict myself to two specific examples here. 
One of the examples relates to the dismissal of civil servants. In this case, a law made it possible to 
dismiss civil servants without giving any specific reason, in order to facilitate the hiring of new 
personnel in public administration. Both the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the ECtHR found that 
the measure violated the right of access to a court and thus the right to a fair trial. 
The other example deals with an early retirement scheme for judges, prosecutors and notaries which 
substantially reduced the mandatory retirement age for this group. This was regarded by the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court as an infringement of the independence of the judiciary. Ultimately, 
the issue was resolved by the CJEU, which ruled that the measure was not proportionate and thus 
constituted an unlawful discrimination based on age.  
These precedents indicate that the implementation of the proposal of Armin von Bogdandy and 
Michael Ioannidis requires a great deal of legal precision inasmuch it entails the early retirement or 
other form of dismissal of civil servants. Even more precaution is warranted in relation to the judiciary. 
An early retirement scheme for judges would probably not be unlawful under all circumstances. Yet 
the objectives must be very clearly set and the proportionality of the measure must be demonstrated.   
This is not to say that the proposal of Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis is not worth following 
through. On the contrary. As populism rises and crises of the rule of law emerge, we have to think out 
of the box. More of the same will not help, innovation is needed. I submit that the success of this 
innovative proposal would largely depend on the precision of the planning of the legal details and on 
securing sufficient democratic support. 
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